Thursday, May 9, 2013

Fwd: qotd: CMS pushes price transparency

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-------- Original Message --------
Subject: qotd: CMS pushes price transparency
Date: Thu, 9 May 2013 12:08:03 -0700
From: Don McCanne <don@mccanne.org>
To: Quote-of-the-Day <quote-of-the-day@mccanne.org>



Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
May 8, 2013
Administration Offers Consumers an Unprecedented Look at Hospital Charges

New data released today show significant variation across the country
and within communities in what hospitals charge for common inpatient
services.

"Currently, consumers don't know what a hospital is charging them or
their insurance company for a given procedure, like a knee replacement,
or how much of a price difference there is at different hospitals, even
within the same city," Secretary Sebelius said.

These amounts can vary widely. For example, average inpatient charges
for services a hospital may provide in connection with a joint
replacement range from a low of $5,300 at a hospital in Ada, Okla., to a
high of $223,000 at a hospital in Monterey Park, Calif.

"Transformation of the health care delivery system cannot occur without
greater price transparency," said Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, M.D., RWJF
president and CEO.

http://www.cms.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=4596

Medicare Provider Charge Data
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/index.html


Comment: So now we have access to hospital chargemaster prices -
meaningless numbers that nobody pays. And that is going to make us
better health care shoppers?

What matters are payments, not prices. Actual payments are negotiated
prospectively by private insurers, and even more effectively by
Medicare. Cash paying patients usually feebly attempt to conduct
negotiations retroactively, if they pay at all.

This CMS effort on hospital price transparency will have almost no
impact on controlling total health care spending since chargemaster
prices are a fabrication.

There is a far better way to control spending without forcing patients
to make unwise health care decisions in their efforts to avoid the
financial burdens of health care. Each hospital should be placed on a
global budget, just as we do with our police and fire departments. That
way, services are rendered simply when needed, without having an
associated price tag.

Requiring price shopping as a prerequisite to health care access is
anathema to health care justice.

Tuesday, May 7, 2013

Fwd: qotd: Health Affairs articles on Medicare reform options

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-------- Original Message --------
Subject: qotd: Health Affairs articles on Medicare reform options
Date: Tue, 7 May 2013 13:26:51 -0700
From: Don McCanne <don@mccanne.org>
To: Quote-of-the-Day <quote-of-the-day@mccanne.org>



Health Affairs
May 2013
Tackling the Cost Conundrum


Medicare Essential: An Option To Promote Better Care And Curb Spending
Growth
By Karen Davis, Cathy Schoen and Stuart Guterman

We describe a new option we call Medicare Essential, which would combine
Medicare's hospital, physician, and prescription drug coverage into an
integrated benefit with an annual limit on out-of-pocket expenses for
covered benefits. Cost sharing would be reduced for enrollees who seek
care from high-quality low-cost providers. Out-of-pocket savings from
lower premiums and health care costs for a Medicare Essential enrollee
could be $173 per month, compared to what an enrollee would pay with
traditional Medicare, prescription drug and private supplemental
coverage. Financed by a budget-neutral premium, we estimate that this
new plan choice could reduce total health spending relative to current
projections by $180 billion and reduce employer retiree spending by $90
billion during 2014–23. Given its potential, such an alternative should
be a part of the debate over the future of Medicare.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/5/900.abstract


Supplemental Coverage Associated With More Rapid Spending Growth For
Medicare Beneficiaries
By Ezra Golberstein, Kayo Walsh, Yulei He and Michael E. Chernew

Supplemental coverage makes health care more affordable for
beneficiaries but also makes beneficiaries insensitive to the cost of
their care, thereby increasing the demand for care. We found that
supplemental insurance coverage was associated with significantly higher
rates of overall spending growth. Specifically, employer-sponsored and
self-purchased supplemental coverage were associated with annual total
spending growth rates of 7.17 percent and 7.18 percent, respectively,
compared to 6.08 percent annual growth for beneficiaries without
supplemental coverage. Results for Medicare program spending were more
equivocal, however. Our results are consistent with the belief that
current trends away from generous employer-sponsored supplemental
coverage and efforts to restrict the generosity of supplemental coverage
may slow spending growth.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/5/873.abstract


Public Financing Of The Medicare Program Will Make Its Uniform Structure
Increasingly Costly To Sustain
By Katherine Baicker, Mark Shepard and Jonathan Skinner

In this article we describe a model incorporating the benefits of public
programs and the cost of tax financing. The model implies that the
"one-size-fits-all" Medicare program, with everyone covered by the same
insurance policy, will be increasingly difficult to sustain. We show
that a Medicare program with guaranteed basic benefits and the option to
purchase additional coverage could lead to more unequal health spending
but slower growth in taxation, greater overall well-being, and more
rapid growth of gross domestic product.

Our model thus helps explain the rapid growth in US health care
expenditures relative to other countries. More important, the model
highlights the trade-offs in different approaches to reining in public
spending — from the current approach of providing a uniform benefit that
increasingly crowds out other programs, to a less egalitarian model that
guarantees only a basic benefit and redirects some redistribution toward
other programs.

Our analysis suggests that the policy of providing a uniform benefit to all
— rather than a basic benefit that higher-income residents can augment
— may be increasingly untenable if health care expenditures continue to
rise.

Other excerpts:

Why has the United States diverged so dramatically from its
counterparts? This divergence is probably not explained by commonly
cited factors such as administrative costs — already high by the 1980s —
or physician salaries, which have stagnated over the past decade.

The implications of our model are not dissimilar to the idea of
voucher-type premium support suggested over the years by Ezekiel Emanuel
and Victor Fuchs, Henry Aaron and Robert Reischauer, and Rep. Paul Ryan
(R-WI). Indeed, it may appear that this plan most closely resembles a
Ryan-style premium support plan.

Our "basic" plan does not correspond so much to a high-deductible or
higher-cost-sharing plan, but rather to one that covers a more limited
set of treatments or providers. Unlike high-deductible plans, the basic
plan need not expose poorer households to the risk of substantial cost
sharing. Instead, it is designed to limit coverage to treatments with
proven effectiveness at a reasonable cost. Of course, identifying which
treatments are of high value — and for which patients — poses
substantial challenges.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to offering this kind of plan choice more
widely in Medicare is that it would require setting aside the
egalitarian goals enshrined in the Medicare legislation of 1965.
Publicly providing only basic coverage would implicitly recognize that
higher-income households would probably elect to procure more generous
coverage — and, ultimately, to obtain more health care and possibly
better health outcomes.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/5/882.abstract

Background paper (40 pages): "Optimal Healthcare Spending with
Redistributive Financing"

http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/papers/ShepardBaickerSkinner_OptimalHealthSpending.pdf


Three Large-Scale Changes To The Medicare Program Could Curb Its Costs
But Also Reduce Enrollment
By Christine Eibner, Dana P. Goldman, Jeffrey Sullivan and Alan M. Garber

With Medicare spending projected to increase to 24 percent of all
federal spending and to equal 6 percent of the gross domestic product by
2037, policy makers are again considering ways to curb the program's
spending growth. We used a microsimulation approach to estimate three
scenarios: imposing a means-tested premium for Part A hospital
insurance, introducing a premium support credit to purchase health
insurance, and increasing the eligibility age to sixty-seven. We found
that the scenarios would lead to reductions in cumulative Medicare
spending in 2012–36 of 2.4–24.0 percent. However, the scenarios also
would increase out-of-pocket spending for enrollees and, in some cases,
cause millions of seniors not to enroll in the program and to be left
without coverage.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/5/891.abstract


Additional Reductions In Medicare Spending Growth Will Likely Require
Shifting Costs To Beneficiaries
By Michael E. Chernew

The Affordable Care Act created a projected trajectory for Medicare
spending per beneficiary that is lower than historical growth rates.
Although opportunities for one-time savings exist, any long-term savings
from Medicare, beyond those already forecast, will probably require a
shift in spending from taxpayers to beneficiaries via higher beneficiary
premium contributions (overall or via means testing), changes in
eligibility, or greater cost sharing at the point of service.

http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/5/859.abstract


Comment: At a time when our politicians have decided to open
discussions on reducing government spending in Medicare, it likely is no
coincidence that this cluster of articles on ways of reforming the
financing of Medicare appears in the leading journal of health policy -
Health Affairs. But beware; the thrust of most of the articles should
raise our concerns.

The most alarming articles are the pair from Katherine Baicker and her
colleagues. They support unlimited care with "better health outcomes"
for higher-income households, with only "basic" care for for the rest of
us, even though they note that defining basic care "poses substantial
challenges." Class division in health care seems to be a uniquely
American concept. "It would require setting aside the egalitarian goals
enshrined in the Medicare legislation of 1965."

The article by Ezra Golberstein and his colleagues calls for diminishing
the financial protection offered by supplemental Medigap and retiree
health benefits "to restrict the generosity of supplemental coverage,"
making beneficiaries more sensitive to the cost of their care, even
though "results for Medicare program spending were more equivocal."
Feeling the pain of their health care spending seems to be the policy
goal even if the total reduction in Medicare spending is only nominal.

Christine Eibner and her colleagues propose, "imposing a means-tested
premium for Part A hospital insurance, introducing a premium support
credit to purchase health insurance, and increasing the eligibility age
to sixty-seven" as three means of reducing overall Medicare spending,
even though these measures would shift costs to the beneficiaries and
cause perhaps millions of them to withdraw from Medicare and remain
uninsured.

Michael Chernew keeps it simple. Lowering the projected trajectory for
Medicare spending "will probably require a shift in spending from
taxpayers to beneficiaries via higher beneficiary premium contributions
(overall or via means testing), changes in eligibility, or greater cost
sharing at the point of service." In other words, reduce the tax
transfer by sticking it to the seniors.

We can thank Karen Davis, Cathy Schoen and Stuart Guterman for not
causing us to lose all hope. Their proposal - "Medicare Essential" - is
designed to increase the coverage and efficiency of Medicare. They would
combine the hospital Part A, physician Part B, and drug Part D programs
into a single program with less administrative complexity. They would
also add much needed catastrophic coverage by placing a maximum on
out-of-pocket expenses. They would also fold in the benefits of
supplemental plans eliminating the need for wasteful, superfluous
Medigap and retiree health plans. Their proposal would actually reduce
spending for most Medicare beneficiaries while enhancing the benefits.

They would leave in place the flawed Medicare Advantage plans, although
competing with a truly superior public plan could make them obsolete -
the goal of "the public option." They would have the deductible apply to
Part A, opening the treacherous territory of a path for more cost
shifting to beneficiaries. Also they do not mention that Medicare
Essential could eventually be expanded to include everyone, becoming an
improved Medicare for all. There are many other important features of
the PNHP version of the single payer model that they do not address, and
that we won't mention here. Suffice it to say, that Medicare Essential
is only a tiny though important step in the direction in which we should
be headed.

For incrementalists, Medicare Essential should captivate you. For those
of us who are impassioned single payer supporters, we should continue to
advocate for moving the political process forward toward achieving an
Improved Medicare for All single payer program as soon as possible.

Monday, May 6, 2013

Fwd: qotd: Gerald Friedman: The Unhappy Marriage of Economics and Health Care

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-------- Original Message --------
Subject: qotd: Gerald Friedman: The Unhappy Marriage of Economics and
Health Care
Date: Mon, 6 May 2013 12:31:46 -0700
From: Don McCanne <don@mccanne.org>
To: Quote-of-the-Day <quote-of-the-day@mccanne.org>



Unions for Single Payer health Care
May 6, 2013
The Unhappy Marriage of Economics and Health Care
By Gerald Friedman, Ph.D., Professor of Economics, University of
Massachusetts at Amherst

America's health care system is collapsing, and we can blame the
Economics profession. Most economists approach health care in the wrong
way, viewing it as a commodity like shoes or the laptop on which I
write. Instead, health care is an idiosyncratic commodity, subject to
uncertainty and "asymmetric information" leading to destructive
behavior. Trying to force health care into a box, treating it like other
commodities, economists have promoted cost sharing, market competition,
and insurance oversight of health care providers that have inflated the
administrative burden while denying ever more Americans access.

While other countries have controlled health care costs by restraining
administrative expenses and drug prices, ballooning costs in the United
States come from policies promoted by economists who have urged
governments and providers to control costs by making consumers
responsible for more of the costs even while raising administrative
costs and ignoring monopolistic pricing of pharmaceuticals. Viewing the
injured, sick, and disabled as "consumers," economists see insurance as
the source of rising costs because they are not responsible for the
costs of care they receive and, therefore, overuse health care. Rising
copayments and deductibles are intended to discourage "consumers" from
"abusing" health care, as if the victims of auto accidents or cancer
should shop around for cheaper, and competition among insurers while
limiting provider services by providing more administrative supervision.
Ignoring evidence that Americans are less likely to see doctors and
other health providers than are residents of other affluent countries,
these economists have blamed the high cost of our health care on
insurance which, they assume, leads to wasteful over-practice and the
provision of unnecessary health care services. Their solution is greater
cost sharing, more regulation of providers, capitation, and even the end
to insurance by substituting medical savings accounts for insurance.

For 40 years, many economists' have promoted increasing cost sharing
through higher copayments and deductibles, the replacement of
fee-for-service payment systems with capitation where providers are paid
a fixed amount for patients as in Health Maintenance Organizations, and
competition where multiple insurers offer a variety of plans catered to
individual consumer's interests and in competition with each other. Far
from limiting health care cost increases, these practices have produced
the worst of all worlds, rising costs along with restrictions on access.
Costs have risen because these recommendations have inflated the
administrative burden in health care, the costs of the billing and
insurance activities within provider offices as well as the cost of the
health insurance industry itself. While restricting access, limiting the
benefit to Americans of some of the dramatic improvements in health care
practice of the last decades, these practices have not bent the cost
curve or slowed health care inflation even while denying more and more
Americans access to affordable health care.

The waste involved in the current system has a redeeming feature: it
provides abundant space for an improved system that could improve access
and services even while dramatically lowering costs by eliminating
administrative waste. If we lowered administrative costs and drug prices
to the Canadian level, we could save nearly $600 billion dollars, more
than enough to provide coverage to all of the uninsured while improving
access for the millions of underinsured. If we see past the bad
recommendations of market-fundamentalists, we can improve health care
and save money. An outcome that even economists should favor.

http://unionsforsinglepayer.org/articles/2013-05-05/the-unhappy-marriage-of-economics-and-health-care


Comment: Which comes first, economic theory or policy? Intuitively, it
seems that a solid understanding of economics should form the basis for
developing policies. The obvious flaw is that economics is not a hard
science, allowing you flexibility to choose economic theory that
conforms to whatever policy you favor.

In the United States we have relied heavily on economists who are
market-fundamentalists. They begin with market theory, and then they
establish policies that supposedly would provide us the greatest value
in health care. Yet we have ended up with a profoundly expensive, highly
wasteful system of mediocre-to-poor quality, while falling far short of
the goals of making health care affordable and accessible for everyone.

It seems unlikely that the market-fundamentalists would contend that
they choose policies first and then use market theory to reach their
goals. If so, then they would have to explain to us why they wanted
today's outcomes. So much for market fundamentalism.

Advocates of health care justice first choose policies that would ensure
quality care for everyone that is affordable for society as a whole.
Then they apply economic theory to achieve the goals of those policies.
Other nations have shown that this works.

In his article, Massachusetts Professor Gerald Friedman explains how we
can get it right - producing better health care while saving money - an
outcome that all economists should favor, that is if they are pure to
the art and science of their profession.