Monday, August 8, 2016

qotd: The 3Rs have failed to stabilize the exchanges

Health Affairs Blog
August 1, 2016
Struggling To Stabilize: 3Rs Litigation And The Future Of The ACA Exchanges
By Mike Adelberg and Nicholas Bagley

Six years after passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the individual and small-group insurance markets — the markets that the ACA remade — are still having growing pains. Health insurers have endured large losses and a number of ACA-created co-ops and other small insurers have failed. Consolidation among providers and insurers is an increasing and concerning trend. And many insurers are poised to raise premiums substantially for 2017, further stoking frustration with the insurance industry.

Part of insurers' difficulty is that the risk pool in the individual and small-group markets, particularly on the exchanges, is sicker and smaller than originally projected. But the three programs — reinsurance, risk corridors, and risk adjustment — that the ACA's drafters hoped would help stabilize premiums in the revamped markets have also not performed as expected. Dashed expectations have led to market instability and to a flurry of lawsuits around the "3Rs."

But make no mistake about it: trouble with the 3Rs has spooked insurers and raised questions about the viability of the ACA-reformed markets. Based on preliminary analyses, the 2017 exchanges will have fewer options, larger premium increases, and less generous benefits than any year since the ACA marketplaces came on line in 2014. Congressional intervention has damaged the ACA markets — hurting both insurers that sell health plans and the consumers who purchase them. Perhaps the exchanges will find their footing again, but the difficulties with the 3Rs serve as a stark reminder that ACA implementation remains much harder than supporters anticipated.


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The Health Care Blog
August 7, 2016
Risk Adjustment Gone Wrong
By Jonathan Halvorson

The Affordable Care Act was intended to usher in a new era of competition and choice in health insurance, and at first it succeeded. But increasingly, provisions in the law are undermining competition and wiping out start-up after start-up. If something isn't done soon, the vast majority of new insurers formed in the wake of the ACA will fail, and many old-line insurers that took the opportunity to expand and compete in the new markets will leave.

Risk adjustment requires an insurer to report on the health risk of its members, and to do that it needs good data. Plans that played the game better from the start set a high priority on collecting and reporting on that information. However, it is much harder to get good data if a member just joined than if you have had that member enrolled prior to the ACA exchanges and can mine your data warehouse for all those ICD codes that boost the risk score. The dominant pre-ACA players had more years of member data, and mature analytics capabilities, to help them maximize their risk scoring. This has created a serious penalty for new entrants in the first few years which CMS has not addressed.


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Comment by Don McCanne

The 3Rs - reinsurance, risk corridors, and risk adjustment - were designed to stabilize the ACA insurance exchanges, but we're seeing market instability instead. Next year, only risk adjustment remains, and the insurers have demonstrated to us that they know how to game the system.

Considering that the exchanges insure less than four percent of our population, you might think that we would be ready to abandon this failed experiment and move on. But, no. The powers that be know that pressure will be on to enact their dreaded single payer system, so they struggle on. Far be it from us to enact a system that would actually achieve the goals of reform.

Friday, August 5, 2016

qotd: Tory plans for NHS privatization revealed

The BMJ

August 5, 2016

Tory plans for NHS privatisation released during parliamentary recess

By Alex Scott-Samuel


July 2016 saw the very quiet publication of two key documents charting the route to the privatisation of the NHS in England. Firstly, from NHS England, came Strengthening Financial Performance and Accountability in 2016-17. This is the latest set of instructions on the implementation of NHS chief executive Simon Stevens's Five Year Forward View (5YFV).


The 5YFV is increasingly coming to resemble one of Stalin's Five Year Plans from the 1950s. As the new guidance makes clear, Stevens's latest collectivisation strategy, the Sustainability and Transformation Plans (STPs), is being rigidly imposed across England.


My alternative title for the guidance document would be "Policing the government's privatisation plans." Having constructed, with help from the Treasury, a universal set of NHS trust financial deficits based on arbitrarily imposed cash limits, NHS England is now using those deficits to legitimise impossibly tight controls on hospital trusts, clinical commissioning groups (CCGs), and other NHS agencies to ensure they conform to central proposals for cuts and mergers between NHS institutions.


At the same time, private sector and insurance friendly "new models of care" are being imposed in community settings, further undermining NHS hospitals. The ultimate intended outcomes of this massive, dictatorial reorganisation process are privatisation, co-payments, charges, and insurance funded care.


These intentions are made clearer in a second policy paper, similarly released during the parliamentary recess when it is least likely to be noticed: the NHS Improvement Business Plan 2016/17. The plan states that providers will be required "to transform services in line with the 5YFV and this will include making use of new care models and innovative organisational forms." A priority for 2016/17 is "to facilitate independent sector providers to form NHS partnerships."


We are told that: "We intend to bring together the most promising potential areas for formal collaboration between NHS Improvement, providers, independent sector partners, NHS England, and other key stakeholders into a new work programme. The key elements of this programme in the first instance will examine the opportunities in the areas of:


– mainstreaming clinical capacity for elective, outpatient, and diagnostic care;

– joint ventures and/or outsourcing of new, novel, or restructured clinical

services;

– joint ventures and novel financing for facilities and/or technology;

– independent sector management models to support capability and leadership challenges."


In other words, before the end of the 2016-17 financial year, we will see the new Conservative government start to impose the large scale privatisation of clinical services, foreshadowed in the Health and Social Care Act 2012. In the event of any doubts regarding the obligatory nature of these policies, the NHS England report referred to earlier makes it clear that "special measures" (central takeover of local management) will be imposed if agencies fail to balance the books or deviate in any way from the government's plans.


In this context, it's ironic to recall all the fluffy political spin about "putting GPs in the driving seat" when CCGs were launched in 2012. By contrast, we are now told by NHS England that CCGs that fail to follow Stevens's diktat will be disbanded and/or forced to become US style accountable care organisations (ACOs). This is with the aim of promoting mergers, cuts, and closures in the publicly provided NHS and introducing community based "integrated packages of care," which are readily amenable to private sector provision and insurance funding—as occurs in the US ACOs on which this particular "new model of care" is based.


It is no coincidence that the House of Lords is currently calling for evidence to be submitted to its new select committee on the long term sustainability of the NHS.


This inquiry, supported by government ministers, is likely to make recommendations that will legitimise the aims of Stevens's five year plan, including the "inevitability" of top-ups, co-payments, charges, and of the short term personal health budgets and longer term health insurance system that would be required to fund them. This toxic combination of an increasingly insurance based and increasingly privately provided health service will signal the final dismantling of what was once our National Health Service in England—a horrific and destructive act, which we now know to have been first proposed by Prime Minister Theresa May's predecessor Margaret Thatcher in 1982.


http://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2016/08/05/tory-plans-for-nhs-privatisation-released-during-parliamentary-recess/


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Comment by Don McCanne


We've been concerned for some time about the privatization of England's National Health Service. The process is now underway. The Tory government is threatening the conversion of their delivery system into US style accountable care organizations, ignoring the fact that they have failed to improve quality or control costs. As we stumble along with our grossly inadequate efforts to reform our system, we can learn from the British how not to do it, which, as we see, bears an uncanny resemblance to what we are already doing.


Thursday, August 4, 2016

qotd: Should we require providers to accept Medicaid?

California Healthline
August 4, 2016
California's Public Hospitals Face New Medi-Cal Mandate
By Pauline Bartolone

Public hospitals in California will be required to contract with at least one Medi-Cal managed care plan starting in 2018.

But advocates for low-income Californians say one regional contract with a Medi-Cal insurer is not enough to ensure adequate access to care. In addition, public hospitals may be exempted from the mandate if "good faith" contract negotiation efforts have failed.

The Western Center on Law and Poverty, an advocacy group, lobbied lawmakers to require that public hospitals contract with all Medi-Cal managed care plans in their region.

But such a mandate was not included in the hospital financing arrangement, which is part of what's known as the "Medi-Cal 2020 waiver" — a $6.2 billion agreement between state officials and the federal government to facilitate programs related to health care quality, access and cost.

The agreement is intended to improve the quality of care and enhance access to it for the state's 13 million-plus Medi-Cal enrollees, about 80 percent of whom are in managed care plans.

The Western Center said it decided to advocate for broader Medi-Cal coverage after hearing about the challenges Medi-Cal enrollees face trying to get specialized care at some University of California health systems.

Public hospitals like San Francisco General Hospital and Harbor-UCLA Medical Center often serve Medi-Cal enrollees, but they are not obligated to provide all services to these patients. The hospitals say that Medi-Cal managed care reimbursements often do not cover the costs they incur caring for those patients.

"We hear from our local legal aid partners that there are significant specialty access problems for some Medi-Cal members who would like to be able to access services at UC hospitals," the Western Center's director of public advocacy, Elizabeth Landsberg, wrote in a letter to lawmakers.

Landsberg's group wants the new requirement for Medi-Cal contracting to provide for the full scope of health care services, including primary and specialty care.

California Senate Health Committee Chairman Ed Hernandez (D-West Covina) authored one of the bills that formally turned the new public hospital funding rules into state law. He says the Western Center's suggested contracting requirements weren't included because of the financial difficulty they would impose.

"Ideally, I would love to see all the public hospitals, including the UCs, see any and every Medi-Cal patient that comes in the door," said Hernandez.

"The dilemma is…you can't force people to see Medi-Cal patients because of the poor reimbursement rates."


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Kaiser Health News
August 3, 2016
Obamacare Expansion A Bumpy Ride For Rural Health Clinics
By Pauline Bartolone

When Medi-Cal, California's version of Medicaid, was first expanded under the Affordable Care Act in early 2014, the number of people insured under the program doubled to around 40,000 people in the region served by Shasta Community Health. Not only did the clinics see new patients, but the demand for services soared from existing ones who were newly insured.

The clinic network already had a shortage of doctors and nurses. — a problem shared by many other rural health clinics in California.

"The … more new patients we brought in, the more stress on the providers, the more likely [they] were going to leave, the deeper the crisis went," said Shasta Community Health Center CEO C. Dean Germano. So he decided to close the network's five clinics to new adult Medi-Cal patients, though they continued to serve all of their existing patients and accepted new children.

Q: Were you able to meet the demand for all these new services?

Germano:  No, not at all. We quickly became overwhelmed, although there were a couple of things happening all at once. One was certainly the growth in Medicaid coverage, but at the very same time, the state of California expanded Medi-Cal managed care into 28 rural counties. We are one of them. We did not have Medi-Cal managed care prior to this.

We were assigned patients, then assigned more patients. We quickly reached a point where we could not take on more new adult patients to our practice. We had to essentially constrain and at one point close the practice to new adult Medicaid patients.

It was a very big hit [to] the community because adult patients had to go further afield to find services outside of the emergency room. Under managed care, it's [the health plan's] responsibility to find a medical home and some of the medical homes were 30 to 40 miles into the mountains.


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Kaiser Family Foundation
March 2, 2016
Medi-Cal Managed Care: An Overview and Key Issues
By Margaret Tatar, Julia Paradise, and Rachel Garfield

Access to care

Problem with access to care in Medi-Cal FFS carry over into managed care, challenging Medi-Cal health plans to establish adequate provider networks and improve care. Gaps in access to certain specialists, including psychiatrists and other behavioral health providers, and long-term care services, are the most significant gaps. Providers have cited Medi-Cal's low payment rates as a barrier to their participation in the program and sued the state on the basis that the fees violate federal Medicaid payment standards. Language and cultural gaps in access to care and gaps in rural access are additional issues.

Major current issues

Two recent developments – CMS' proposed modernization of the Medicaid managed care regulations and the approval of "Medi-Cal 2020," the renewal of California's section 1115 waiver – can be expected to bear on the Medi-Cal managed care program, by increasing plan- and state-level requirements and state oversight responsibilities, and by setting the stage for potential changes in the role and operation of managed care plans in a transforming health care delivery and payment system.



Comment by Don McCanne

One of the great successes of the Affordable Care Act is the expansion of Medicaid coverage for low-income individuals. But how do you define success? Let's look at California.

One-third of Californians are on Medi-Cal - California's Medicaid program. Yes, one-third! Yet California has one of the lowest Medicaid provider payment rates in the nation and frequently does not cover the costs of care provided. California has now transferred about four-fifths of the Medi-Cal patients into managed care. Managed care plans have significant additional administrative costs, yet payment rates were not increased over what was being paid under the fee-for-service program. That means that the actual health care providers have had a further net decrease in payment rates.

So who is going to see these patients? Do you send them to local community health centers? These centers have had problems recruiting enough primary care professionals and thus have had difficulties accepting more Medi-Cal patients. The Shasta Community Health Center even had to temporarily close the practice to new adult Medi-Cal patients. Where do they go?

Taxpayer-supported public hospitals and clinics, including the University of California health systems, seem like a logical place to refer these patients. But they have the same capacity issues. Further, many specialists in the community refuse to accept Medi-Cal patients and thus a greater burden would be placed on the academic center specialists. Most of these specialists are not advocates of noblesse oblige. They particularly do not want to be overworked and underpaid.

Just as emergency departments no longer have the right to refuse patients, some suggest that physicians, hospitals and clinics also be required to accept Medi-Cal patients. Although this was considered, the California legislature decided to take a lesser step. As of 2018, all public hospitals in California will be required to contract with at least one Medi-Cal managed care plan.

This may not seem like that big of a deal, but it does expand the principle beyond emergency departments that the government can mandate that providers be required to see patients while refusing to adequately fund their care. Will it be private hospitals next? Outpatient centers? Private medical practices? Real problem, wrong solution.

What we need instead is an equitable system of financing health care - a single payer national health program. A patient's access to care should not depend on the payment source, as it does now. Access should be based strictly on health care needs, backed up by an automatic, equitable payment system.